TRANSCRIPT OF

ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION 2015 ANNUAL CONVENTION

PRESENTATION: "SEEKING THE 'TALLEST TIMBER' ALASKA'S MERIT SELECTION SYSTEM IN THE CROSSHAIRS"

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(DVD)

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: More of that. So, ladies and gentlemen, I'd like now to begin with our Law Day luncheon presentation. It's my pleasure to be able to introduce today's luncheon program. As we celebrate Law Day and honor our system of justice, it is timely and appropriate to pause and reflect on the foundation of the rule of law in our state, which is, of course, the Alaska Constitution. Over 50 years ago our constitution's framers gathered here in Fairbanks in the dead of

winter to craft what they hoped would be an enlightened and enduring document to guide Alaska's future, but perhaps the greatest significance to those of us in the legal profession are the provisions of the Judiciary Article which govern the structure and functioning of our court system, including our method of selecting judges.

For over 50 years Alaska has employed a merit-based system which seeks to ensure that only the most highly qualified members of the bar attain the bench — the tallest timber, in the words of one Constitutional Convention delegate. As you may know, there is a resolution currently pending in the legislature to amend the constitution and change our judicial selection process in a manner that threatens merits election. The effort is controversial and officially opposed by the Alaska Bar Association and the Alaska Court System. Our speakers today will explore the rationale behind the Judiciary Article and

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Berkeley. He came to Alaska in 1970 directly from law school and clerked for the late justices John Dimond in Juneau and one of our most legendary characters here in Fairbanks, Jay Rabinowitz of Fairbanks. He has made his home in Alaska for over 40 years. He and his wife Anne raised four children here, and today all of their children either live in Alaska or maintain strong ties to the state. Three of his four children are lawyers, and the fourth is a legislative aide. Devotion to the law and to Alaska, clearly, runs in the blood of this

Throughout his career Justice Carpeneti has been a staunch advocate for the merits election of judges. When current efforts to amend the Judiciary Article gained momentum in the legislature last year he knew he had to do something, so barely a year into retirement he interrupted his plans for a leisurely schedule to co-found Justice Not Politics Alaska, a nonprofit organization devoted to preserving the Judiciary Article and protecting our current system of judicial selection from increased political influence. Today he serves as the organization's co-chair and has spent much of the past year educating legislators and members of the public about the importance of fair and impartial courts. We are fortunate to have him here today to speak to us. I hope you'll join me in welcoming Bud Carpeneti. (Applause)

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examine the many concerns that current efforts to amend it raise.

We are very fortunate today to have someone with us who can speak directly to what Constitutional Convention delegates were thinking, because he was one of them. Vic Fischer has spent the past 60 years explaining and defending our constitution, and we are honored and delighted to have him with us today. He will be introduced after a brief presentation by our other guest speaker, Retired Justice Walter "Bud" Carpeneti.

For most of us Justice Carpeneti needs no introduction. He's one of the most long-standing jurists in our state's history, devoting 32 years of his career to the Alaska -- to Alaska's judiciary. He was appointed in 1981 to the superior -- as a superior court judge in Juneau, and in 1997 to the Alaska Supreme Court, where he served until his retirement in 2013. During his tenure on our state's highest court his colleagues elected him chief justice for the 2009 to 2012 term. As chief justice he promoted civic education, public understanding of our justice system and founded the Supreme Court Live program that has brought oral arguments to high schools across the state. He has served as the founding Alaska chair of the iCivics program, which was initiated by Retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.

Justice Carpeneti earned his undergraduate degree in history from Stanford University. He has a law degree from U.C.

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JUSTICE CARPENETI: Thank you, Jeff. It's not often that I come to a microphone and have to adjust it down for my height. Those remarks were very kind and probably a little over the top. I didn't do too much interrupting of my leisure time and I've used it well.

Thank you for being here today. This should be an amazing program. I hope that it is, with Vic Fischer, one of only three surviving delegates to Alaska's Constitutional Convention here to talk about one of the crown jewels of our constitution, the Judiciary Article, Article IV.

Before he joins us, however, you might be asking yourself why the subhead above, "Alaska's Merit Selection System in the Crosshairs," and the answer is easy: Senate Joint Resolution 3, a proposed constitutional amendment introduced by Senator Pete Kelly of Fairbanks, which in my view would gravely threaten the fairness, the independence and the excellence of our courts and open our state to at least the possibility of the kinds of abuses never seen here before, but, unfortunately, all too common in the other states. And to show you why I entertain that belief, I'd like to start with the theme of this year's convention, celebrating the Magna Carta and 800 years of opposing -- of the ongoing struggle to honor the notion of self-government in a nation of laws, not of men.

It was, of course, a really revolutionary concept, challenging the divine right of the monarch in many ways, and as

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- The Globe and Mail said recently, it's been called democracy's
- 2 birth certificate and remains a powerful symbol of justice
- triumphing over tyranny, especially in our time, when the
- 4 concepts of freedom and fairness are in constant flux. And I
- 5 thought that important because that quote comes from a couple of
 - months ago, not 800 years ago, and it shows that the struggle
- 7 continues to this day, and while kings are of no continuing
- 8 concern in this country, the imbalance of power brought by
- 9 either or threatened by either the executive or the legislature
- 10 poses a threat to the one branch of government meant to impose
- limits on government and to protect individual rights: the

12 judiciary.

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Returning to the days when kings were players in the affairs of this country, our Declaration of Independence had this to say about George III: "He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing judiciary powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."

So even at the founding of our country this concern about
judicial independence was strong, and so our constitutional
framers took great care to create a judiciary that was
independent, specifying that judges could not be removed except
for cause and their salaries not diminished while they were in

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"Judicial independence' is the principle that judges should reach legal decisions free from outside pressures, political, financial, media-related or popular. Judicial independence means judges must be free to act solely according to the law and their good-faith interpretation of it, no matter how unpopular their decisions might be. It means judges need not fear reprisals for interpreting and apply the law to the best of their abilities. An independent judiciary is a cornerstone not only of our justice system, but of our entire constitutional system of government. Only a truly independent judiciary, free of pressure from, and indebtedness to, political parties, public officials, interest groups, and popular whim, can be truly accountable to the public it serves."

And there's really two kinds of independence, and I think both are important. First, decisional, as to the individual judge and the individual case, and institutional, as to the judiciary itself and its role as a fully co-equal branch of government separate from the legislative and the executive branches. As Sandra Day O'Connor has said, "The founders realized there has to be someplace where being right is more important than being popular or powerful, and where fairness trumps strength. And in our country, that place is supposed to be the courtroom."

So how did we arrive at the mid 20th century at the grail of merit selection? I'd like to take two minutes to go through

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And while the ratification of the constitution itself was being debated, The Federalist and Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist No. 78 made clear the central importance to the new government of judicial independence. Now, in this quote it's clear that he's talking about independence from encroachment by the legislature, but the point remains the same. While Alaska's framers took a different approach than lifetime appointment to ensure independence, they, too, nonetheless, valued as highly as the federal framers the notion that the judiciary must be independent and beholden only to the law, and not to the will of the executive or the legislature or even the public in a given

case.

The court in Marbury v. Madison in 1803, we've already heard today from Professor Chemerinsky, then established the doctrine of judicial review of the acts of the coordinate branches to determine whether they complied with the Constitution, thus establishing both the doctrine of judicial review and cementing the doctrine of separate and coequal branches of the government. And so we have the really important concept of judicial independence, and I looked up The Constitution Project. It's a bipartisan group, and I really mean bipartisan. It's -- the folks that are -- sit on its board comes from -- come from all ends of the political spectrum, and

24 they set this out and I think it's an important principle for us

25 to start off with:

a real quick history of this subject. In broad terms, the 18th

century was the heyday of lifetime appointment, the 19th century

3 witnessed a populous reaction that led to elected judiciaries,

4 and the 20th century, in a reaction against the excesses of big

5 politics in judicial selection, trended toward merit selection,

6 utilizing independent nominating committees charged with

7 presenting lists of highly-qualified applicants to the governor

8 for appointment, with retention election to follow. That brings

9 us to 1955 and the Alaska Constitutional Convention, convened

10 almost 60 years ago, right in this city.

The 55 delegates represented a cross-section of the territory of Alaska, with a diverse assortment of occupations represented by the delegates. I had fun putting this together, counting up who did what. It's not true that lawyers dominated the convention. We've heard that in some of the arguments. There were 13 lawyers. There were 55 delegates. There were folks from all over the state and they represented all kinds of occupations, miners and mining engineers, fishermen, self-described housewives, pilots, clergy, engineer, farmer, builder, photographer, teacher, et cetera, et cetera. It was a great cross-section of Alaska of 1955.

The delegates had a good sense of the challenges before them and they made great preparation to complete their tasks. Tom Stewart, who would become the secretary to the

25 Constitutional Convention, as a member of the Territorial House

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contacted various experts in state administration and contracted with the Public Administration Service to prepare studies on each of several subject areas that the constitution would have to address. The judiciary committee was well organized and efficient. Following its debates and discussions, which I hope we will hear a lot about today from Vic Fischer, it adopted the Judiciary Article, which was ultimately accepted, almost unanimously, by the Constitutional Convention.

The high points of the merit selection were nomination by the Judicial Council, which was charged with finding the best available candidates, the best available timber or the tallest timber, as one of the delegates said, and sending on at least two names to the governor. The council was to be composed of three lawyers appointed by the Board of Governors of the Bar Association, although historically the Board of Governors has held an election in the judicial district involved and has, I believe, always appointed the attorney prevailing in that election, but it's technically appointment by the Board of Governors, and then three laypersons appointed by the governor and confirmed by the legislature, and then, finally, the chief justice ex officio, who votes only when his or her vote would affect the outcome. Essentially, the chief justice votes to break ties, or if you have a three-to-two vote because somebody's missing and there's three votes in favor sending a person on, four are needed, then the chief votes in that

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because, in my view, the Judiciary Article is a splendid example of foresight and incredibly skillful drafting. Now there are about 35 states that have some form of our system, and there isn't a single state that wouldn't want our system in full."

So nirvana, we reached it. It took 200 years-plus after -- well, it took a long time, took six centuries after Magna Carta, and a long time even after the Federal Constitution, but at least by statehood for Alaska we had got it right, a system that looked for merit at the initial phase, and then gave electoral politics its due in the appointment itself -- the governor, after all, is the winner of the last election and makes the final choice -- and turned it all over to the people at a retention election three-plus years after appointment and periodically thereafter.

So end of the story, can we all go home and do something else? Well, not quite. And the reason for that, and the reason for the existence of Justice Not Politics Alaska, is Senate Joint Resolution 3. In a nutshell, I'm not sure how readable that is, it doubles the number of gubernatorial appointments to the Judicial Council, and it requires the attorneys elected by the bar to be confirmed by the legislature. Now, given a merit selection system that has produced a judiciary free of the taint of corruption for about six decades, free of the corrupting influences of partisan elections -- and this is my personal and probably biased view, but -- produced a judiciary that has

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instance.

Sorry, I'm one slide late. This is what should have been up on the screen as I was just describing that. I'm really new at this. Actually, I think I'm doing really well so far, so -- (Lauehter)

This proposal, this outcome, was regarded as the best compromise between competing values in judicial selection. As George McLaughlin, who was chair of the judiciary committee said, "The best compromise and the best solution to a vexing problem between those who feel we should have lifetime tenure so judges can be absolutely independent and those who feel we should have short terms so that judges could be subject to the popular will." And, of course, judges are subject to the popular will now in terms of the retention elections which they stand for every four, six, eight or 10 years, depending on which court they occupy.

As Jay Rabinowitz said, "Our state judicial system really changed in 1955 through the wisdom of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They rejected the concept of straight partisan election of judges, and they rejected the Federal appointment scheme which is Executive appointment, confirmation by the Legislature and lifetime tenure on good behavior. So they came up at that time with the Missouri Plan, which is merits election, merit retention. This is probably one of the greatest things that the Constitutional Convention did

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performed excellently over the past 56 years of statehood, it's not only fair, but I think incumbent to ask why change this system.

I've tried to listen carefully to the arguments of the folks that -- have I gone the wrong way there? Yeah. I've tried to listen carefully to the arguments of the folks that have proposed SJR 3 and I've heard five rationales, and I will say I think they have shifted quite a bit over the last two years, but there are at least five identifiable reasons that are given. Not one of them holds water, and I'd like to go over each briefly in this presentation.

The first argument is that, well, Alaska's an outlier in the prominent role attorneys play on a judicial council and somehow we should get in step with the rest of the country. You know, in answering the outlier argument I'm really tempted to say -- and I'm tempted to say this because it's true and because it's enough of a response -- I'm tempted to say that as the bumper sticker says, "We really don't give a damn how they do it Outside."

(Applause)

And I say that because we should stick with merit selection because it's the best system, even if no one else used it, but I think it's important, also, to say that we're not such an outlier. In 1955 it was already in use. As George McLaughlin said in discussing the Missouri Plan that was in

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effect, the whole theory of it is that a select -- and I'm going to ask you in advance to disregard the gender indications in this quote, because they can be off-putting, but this was almost 60 years ago:

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"The whole theory of the Missouri Plan is that a select and professional group, licensed by the state, can best determine the qualifications of their brothers. It is unquestionably true that in every trade and every profession the men who know their brother careerists the best are the men engaged in the same type of occupation. The theory was that the bar association would attempt to select the best men possible for the bench because they had to work under them."

So the idea was current then. It was thought about. The reason was given. But beyond that, several states have moved in whole or in part toward merit selection over the last 40 or so years, and this is a rough approximation of those -- this is an approxima-- this is a statement of those states that have adopted some or all of the aspects of the merit selection system, and so I think it's just inaccurate to say that we're this terrible outlier.

There was a slide that somehow I just passed over that I wanted to conclude that first discussion with, and it was from the American Judicature Society, and it says, quite simply, merit selection is the best way to select the best judges. So in terms of the outlier argument, I don't think it holds water.

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nonlawyers, and any three on the other side, a mixture of nonlawyers and lawyers -- are very rare. Six percent of the time. Ties in which you have what I think of in my mind as a perfect split or an even split, three lawyers on one side and three nonlawyers on the other side, are even more rare. They are extremely rare, about 1.4 percent of the time or 16 out of over 1100 votes since 1984, when they started keeping records that are detailed enough to draw these conclusions.

And then going on, in council tie votes the only time that the chief justice votes and the only time that this theory about four versus three, four lawyers and three nonlawyers, can even come into effect, the chief justice usually votes to forward the nominee's name to the governor, in fact, about three-quarters of the time. So, you know, the idea that somehow there's a cabal of lawyers that is keeping qualified people from going to the governor just doesn't add up when you look at the actual numbers

And then, finally, out of those 16 perfect, three lawyers on one side, three nonlawyers on the other side, ties, in about half of them the chief justice voted to send the nominee's name to the governor. So it seems to me that the weight of -- the huge weight of opinion over the last 30 years -- not opinion -of fact over the last 30 years shoots that argument out of the water.

Now, recently because the historical facts don't support

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The second argument that was advanced by the backers of SJR 3 is that lawyers, who make up four of the seven members of the council, quote, dominate the nonlawyer members. There are simply no facts to support this argument. The idea is there's the three lawyers that the Board of Governors appoints, and then there's the chief, so you have four lawyers. Well, let's look at the facts.

Most of the council's votes are unanimous or nearly so. Eighty-one percent, 932 out of 1149 votes taken in the last 30 years are either 6-0 or 5-1, and so the idea that any one group has dominant sway over the council seems misleading to me. And I guess I should -- and I didn't put it down, but I probably should have started with the argument that people like Vicki Otte, Tina Williams, Bill Gordon, Elaine -- Eleanor Andrews, you know, are going to be overwhelmed by somebody because that person has a JD after their name is ridiculous on its face, and it's insulting to those people, but --

And so that's, I guess, the first argument, that historically there have been councils that have had very, very strong public members or nonattorney members, and the idea that because there's three lawyers and the chief justice they're going to be overwhelmed is ridiculous, but when you look at the numbers, the actual votes, most of the votes are unanimous or near so. Ties of any kind -- and when I say any kind, I mean any three members on one side, mixture of lawyers and

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their claims supporters of SJR 3 have honed the argument to 2 state that, well, in recent years the chief justices have been faced with attorney versus nonattorney split votes and have 4 sided with the attorneys, thus, dominating the nonlawyers and keeping good people from going on. And, again, I think the 6 facts simply do not support that claim. Since 2010 the Judicial 7 Council has voted 212 times for 25 judicial vacancies. The chief justice voted 10 times, which is right within the historical averages during that time. In fact, it's a little bit less, because historically the CJ is called upon to vote, remember, in about six percent of the cases. In the last five

years it's happened in five percent of the cases. So I think this argument simply doesn't hold up. The third argument that's made is that if we increase the number of gubernatorial appointees to the council we would attack the problem of diversity in the judiciary, we would attack the problem of a too narrowly-focused council. Well, the

18 first argument in response to that is SJR 3 does not require 19 demographic, geographical or ideological diversity in the

20 governor's appointments. The council doesn't say anything about 21 that and, in fact, the constitution already says that the

22 governor is supposed to make his or her appointments with due

23 regard to area representation. So the current constitution 24 covers that subject. The proposed change doesn't cover it.

Secondly, past governors have appointed minority members

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- and rural members frequently, but no such appointments have been made for over a decade. So I don't think the problem is in the system
- The third argument is giving one person, the governor, the power to name two-thirds of the council would undermine the diversity of ideological views and perspectives. It simply puts too much power in the hands of one person.

And, finally, to the extent that the argument is made that there needs to be more diversity on the council, it's to me compelling that the interest groups or the groups in this state that would supposedly be the beneficiaries of that have unanimously, as far as I can tell, come out against it. AFN in its last convention unanimously voted against SJR 3. The ANCSA corporation CEOs have sent a letter in which it states that all of them oppose SJR 3. The Tanana Chiefs Conference has weighed in as well. And so it just doesn't seem to me that any of those arguments hold up.

And, finally, if we've got this right, yeah, the -- if you remember that slide a little bit back, the claim was, well, it's just more democratic to have a broader input into the selection of judges, and I just don't think these claims are substantiated. The current system has a popularly-elected chief executive make the appointment, followed by a retention election three-plus years after the appointment. Our judges in Alaska are subject to the popular will like no other.

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- that the downside here is very high.
- As Tom Stewart said, "Alaska is fortunate to have the constitutional guarantee of the merit selection merit system for the selection of judges. Our merit system has worked well in Alaska. It has produced high quality judges with integrity and abundant skills and it has kept out corrupting political influences that trouble the other states."

And, finally, as Fairbanks's own Frank Barr -- I thought it would be nice to end with a local representative -- as he said, "I believe that this Committee report that outlined the system of selection of our judges is just about as perfect as can be. It's not perfect, nothing's perfect, but I think it is a system we want."

So with that backdrop as to the issue that we're going to be talking about today, I'd now like to introduce my copresenter for today's program, someone who literally wrote the book, and there it is, Vic Fischer. Vic grew up and attended school in Berlin, Moscow and New York. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II in France, Germany and the Philippines. In 1950 he moved to Alaska, where he worked in community planning and owned a small cabin on F Street when the Anchorage Bowl looked like -- sorry, that was the military picture -- when the Anchorage Bowl looked like this. That's the cabin that Vic lived in.

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I mean, I think we take second place to no one in the argument as to whether or not the Alaska electorate has a chance to be heard on who should be their judges, and is better informed or has the possibility of being better informed through the work that the Judicial Council does and puts on their website about the votes that they are about to cast than anyone in the world -- or as well informed, I think better informed, than anyone else in the world. So I don't think that argument has a lot of traction to begin with.

But continuing on, and taking on the question of legislative confirmation, as George McLaughlin, again, the chair of the committee on the judiciary, said when this issue came up, and it was pretty hotly debated, he said, "If you require a confirmation of your attorney members by the legislature you can promptly see what will happen. No longer is the question based solely on the qualification of the candidate for the bench. If political correctness enters into the determination of the selection of those professional members who are to be placed upon the judicial council, the whole system goes out the window. All you have is one other political method of selection by [sic] your judges."

And I think that's right. I guess the really interesting thing about that quote to me was that the term "political correctness" was in use in 1955. I thought that was kind of a recent thing. Who knew? But I think the point is well stated,

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Anchorage delegate to the Alaska Constitutional Convention which

During the push for Alaska statehood he was elected as an

- 2 took place at the University of Alaska Fairbanks from November
- 3 1955 to February 1956. He was among the youngest delegates and
- 4 is seen here speaking during the convention debates. That's Vic
 - over -- way to the left of that. And another picture of him
 - that's a little bit better, speaking during the debates.

On February 6th, 1956 he was one of the 54 delegates from across the state to sign the final convention document. I have to say that I ran this introduction past Vic and it originally said 55, and he said, well, only 54 of us — and I knew this,

11 I'd forgotten it – only 54 of us signed it that day. One of 12 the delegates from Juneau didn't sign it until a substantial

period of time later, so he was one of the 54 on that day,

although they all eventually signed it -- which was approved by
 Alaskan voters later that year by a margin of two-to-one.

In the many years since Vic Fischer has been a dedicated

public servant, serving in the Alaska Legislature and as founding director of the University of Alaska's Institute of

Social & Economic Research. He has worked tirelessly to support
 and defend our constitution and to explain to Alaskans the goals

and defend our constitution and to explain to Alaskans the goals and the objectives of our state's founders. He has chronicled

and the objectives of our state's founders. He has chronicled his amazing life in the recent memoir, "To Russia With Love."

23 In 2002 Vic spoke with other surviving delegates to our 24 Constitutional Convention at a Bar Historian's Luncheon to

commemorate our founding document. You will notice on the far

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(Pages 22 to 25)

Page 22

- right of this photo another convention delegate who also played
- 2 a key role in our state's founding and who we had hoped would be
- 3 here today, and that's Jack Coghill, but, unfortunately, he's
- 4 not able to be here. He was another young delegate to the
- 5 Constitutional Convention who has devoted much of his life to
- 6 public service, and his legacy continues today through the
- service of his son, Senator John Coghill, who currently serves
- 8 in the legislature and who, again, we also thought would be
- 9 here, but apparently his duties have kept him in Juneau this
- 10
- 11 To our knowledge Vic Fischer, Jack Coghill and Retired
- 12 Superior Court Judge Seaborn Buckalew, pictured here at the 2005
- Bar Convention -- Bar Historian's Luncheon, excuse me, are the 1.3
- 14 only surviving delegates of our Constitutional Convention. We
- 15 are so grateful for their legacy, and we live with the benefit
- 16 of their vision every day.
- 17 And now I would like to invite my co-presenter to the
- 18 stage. Please join me in welcoming Vic Fischer.
- 19 (Applause)
- 20 MR. FISCHER: Thank you.
- 21 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Well, you can't imagine the stress of,
- 22 A, having to appear on a stage with Vic Fischer, and B, having
- 23 to manipulate a PowerPoint, so one out of two so far.
- 24 (Laughter)

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25 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Is the mic on? Okay, thank you. I

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- JUSTICE CARPENETI: And your background was you'd grown up
- in these exotic places, but come to this country as a younger
- 3 person and then gone to school here, and you were out of the
 - army, obviously, and what were the circumstances of coming to
- MR. FISCHER: Oh, it was just a dream when I was going
- overseas and in an army transport across the Atlantic Ocean, I
- was thinking about where I want to alight after the war,
- 9 assuming I came out of it, and I started reading books of the
- 10 states and the further west I got the more I liked going west,
- 11 and having been 10 of my first 15 years in Russia where my
- 12 father was an American correspondent I was interested in north,
- 13 and there was Alaska. And so when I got out of the army I wrote
- 14 to the University of Alaska, asked if they had a course in
- architecture, which I saw as the foundation for city planning, 16 which was the profession I wanted to pursue but they had mining
- 17 and English and agriculture and stuff like that. So I went back
- 18 to Wisconsin, finished Wisconsin and went on to graduate school,
- 19 got a planning degree and, lo and behold, the first professional
- 20 planning job opened up, and it was in Alaska, that I grabbed and
- 22 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Okay, so you're 31 years old, you're a
- 23 young planner, and the Constitutional Convention is put on the
- 2.4 docket. What made you decide to run for a delegate?
 - MR. FISCHER: I was one of a lot of young veterans and

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- relaxed too soon over the technical issues.
- 2 Vic, I'd like to, first of all, thank you for agreeing to
- do this. It's an incredible thrill and honor and privilege, I 3
- 4 think for all of us, to be able to put some questions to you and
- to hear the inside story of the Constitutional Convention, and
- 6 just be with you today.
 - MR. FISCHER: Thank you, Bud. I'm delighted to be here.
- 8 I see a lot of friends. I see a lot of people I've admired for
- many, many decades, and it's a real honor and real pleasure to
- 10 be here, especially sharing the -- this table with Bud
- 11 Carpeneti
- 12 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Well, thank you very much. Let me
- 13 start the questioning period by trying to go to the
- 14 pre-convention era -- I don't mean necessarily decades, but
- 15 before the convention. Let me just ask -- let me ask some
- 16 basic -- how old were you? You were one of the younger ones,
- 17 but how old were you?
- MR. FISCHER: I was 31. Jack Coghill was 30. Tommy 18
- 19 Harris from Valdez was 29, so I was the third youngest.
- 20 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Wow. And at that time what were you 21 doing in terms of an occupation?
- 22 MR. FISCHER: I was unemployed. No, I had been planning
- 23 director for the City of Anchorage and just about this time 60
- 24 years ago I resigned that position so I was completely free to
- 25 run for the Constitutional Convention

- Page 25
- some older people, but mostly young, who were active in a group
- 2 called Operation Statehood, and it was a citizen group to help
- 3 promote statehood, and we had lots of activities. Barry White
- 4 was the president of Operation Statehood, I was the vice
- president, and it was a matter of working for our civil rights,
- 6 because we could not vote for president. We could not vote for
- U.S. senator. We were completely dominated by bureaucrats from
- 8 Washington, D.C., and people who talk about federal overreach 9
- should have lived in Alaska during territorial days.
- 10
 - JUSTICE CARPENETI: So I wanted to ask you about the
- 12 atmosphere regarding the possibility of statehood and you've,
 - obviously, started to talk about that. What was it like, what
- 14 did it feel like being in Alaska then?
- 15 MR. FISCHER: Most Alaskans were for statehood. It was a
- 16 strong movement, it was totally bipartisan, and it was just sort
- 17 of a universal drive, but each year, each Congress, it seemed
- 18 that just as things started to happen, just as one committee
- approved statehood in the House, the Rules Committee of the 19
- 20 House killed it, the Senate might move and it was killed, and 21 each time -- it was very frustrating, and in 1954 Congress
- 22 adjourned and still hadn't done anything about statehood, even
- 23 though it seemed closer than ever, and that's when the decision
- was made, let's write a constitution. We were running parallel 24
- 25 with Hawaii, which wanted statehood. They already had a

(Pages 26 to 29)

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- constitution. We wanted to prove that we're mature enough to become a state. We knew what we were about, and we will prove that we can write the best constitution in the United States.
- JUSTICE CARPENETI: Let me ask you, when you were thinking about writing a constitution and saying we could write the best constitution in the United States was there any particular thought at that time as to the kind of judiciary that you wanted or was it more generalized towards the idea of we can prove that we can govern ourselves?
- 10 MR. FISCHER: Well, I would say the basic idea was we 11 can -- we'll demonstrate, just that the Constitutional Convention, writing a constitution was an active state -- step 12 13 towards statehood, and those of us who were sort on the active 14 front lines saw the constitution as a step towards statehood. 15 It was really after we came to Fairbanks, after we arrived here 16 and the reality sank in that we are writing a constitution for 17 the future State of Alaska, that we really got down to the --18 that became the overriding purpose, that -- statehood was always 19 in the background, but it was really looking to do the best 20 possible job for future generations of Alaskans.
 - Judiciary was one of the fundamental parts of a constitution. There was very strong belief that the three branches of government should be effective. This was very important because we had been a colony of the United States. We had no say in the judiciary. We had a territorial legislature

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- 1 us contemplated. I mean, we had seen it, for better or for
- 2 worse, that's part of the federal system, but one of the things
- 3 that we did in the judicial committee, in all of the committees
- working on the different parts of the constitution, was to see
- what other states had done, what their experience was. More 5
- 6 than anything, we learned what not to do. Occasionally there
- were examples that were moving in a direction that was closer to
- what modern thinking was, what -- where the leaders and whatever
- 9 subject matter was under consideration, what the constructive,
- 10 contemporary thinking was about what should be -- might be
- 11 considered by the Constitutional Convention, and so the
- 12 Judiciary Article was very much like other articles. It fell
- 1.3 into place in some ways far easier than local government
- 14 structure, where we could learn nothing from other states except
- 15 what was -- what we should not do. Resources was very difficult
- 16 to put together because we dealt with a full gamut of resources
- 17 rather than just grazing or water rights or mining and --
 - JUSTICE CARPENETI: Let me *6:45 --
- 18 19
 - MR. FISCHER: Stop.

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- JUSTICE CARPENETI: Let me follow up on -- you said appointment for life was something that had no currency. What about other models, full partisan elections, was that discussed in the debates?
- MR. FISCHER: The only alternative to what we have in the constitution today, was considered by the convention, was a

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- 1 that was totally ineffective. We had a governor appointed by
 - the President of the United States. We wanted to have a system
- 3 that was strong, where responsibility was fixed and each branch
- 4 was effective and independent, and when it came to the judiciary
- it was to be parallel with a strong executive branch headed by a
- 6 single elected chief executive, to have a legislature that was
 - effective and streamlined, and to have an independent judiciary, one that was independent of the executive branch and independent
 - of the legislature, and I think that is essentially what we
- 10 tried and, obviously, the judiciary has over the decades since
- 11 statehood performed more effectively than the legislature and
- 12 the executive put together.
 - (Applause)
 - JUSTICE CARPENETI: I did not know what Vic Fischer was going to say that. I just want to --
- 16 (Laughter) 17
 - JUSTICE CARPENETI: Let me ask you in terms of the considerations that you dealt with in structuring the judiciary, first, did the territorial experience with the federal courts under the territory of Alaska shape the views of the delegates in terms of putting together a judiciary system?
- 22 MR. FISCHER: Certainly we were all familiar with a 23 federal system, which essentially was run from Washington, D.C., 24 and we wanted to have our own system, but also we saw that 25 lifetime appointment was not something that anyone -- any one of

- 1 straightforward partisan election system, and that came up on
 - the floor of the convention. I don't think the judiciary
- 3 committee seriously discussed that or considered -- they may
 - have discussed it, but they -- I don't think they seriously
- considered it, but it was brought up by Fairbanks delegate
- 6 Robert McNealy, an attorney, who argued vehemently that to have
- a democratically elected judiciary, judges and justices, would
- 8 protect us from political influence and corruption, and we had
 - serious discussion.
- 1.0 There was voted -- and the first time it came up, was 11 voted down by I think something like 52 in favor of the merit
- 12 system that was proposed by the committee, with only two votes
- 13 for the election process. It -- the -- this was in second
- 14 reading, and in third reading, the final adoption of the
- 15 article, Bob McNealy brought it up again. We had another
- 16 discussion, another round, and again overwhelmingly defeated the
- 17 idea of elected judges, and so there was never any question
- 18
- about the makeup of the Judicial Council or any question about
- 19 the concept of the Judicial Council.
- 20 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Let me interrupt you there and ask you 21 kind of a pointed question about the debate that's going on now,
- 22
- which is that the bar, which has been sometimes referred to as
- 23 an elite guild, has way too much say in the appointment of
- 24 judges under the system and that's why the governor should be 25
 - given twice as many appointments, and I guess the general

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(Pages 30 to 33)

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question is why the role for the Bar Association that the framers chose, equal with the governor's appointing of three

MR. FISCHER: As I mentioned, the idea was that we want an independent judiciary, we wanted the best qualified people to rise up to judgeships and justices, and one way of getting there was to get the people who have to work in the judicial sphere who best would know the candidates or applicants for judgeships and have to work with them, have those people be part of the process. Well, the idea was if we let the governor decide which lawyers should be on the Judicial Council, you right off the bat have a -- you have politics coming into it. The Bar Association, the organized bar of the state, was the vehicle to get the appointments of the best qualified attorney members for

JUSTICE CARPENETI: What about the chief justice's role, the tie-breaking role, which as we've seen in those votes happens pretty infrequently? What was the thinking behind creating the chief as --

the council. So, again, there was no dispute about that, having

21 MR. FISCHER: Let me ask you. I looked at the 2.2 constitution. It doesn't say that the chief justice votes only 2.3

JUSTICE CARPENETI: That's true. 2.4 25 MR. FISCHER: That must be by rule of the courts. So far Page 32

when Vic Fischer says, "That's not what we said." We'll come back to that later.

And I see that we're close to running out of time, but I did want to ask this question. In your book, "Alaska's Constitutional Convention," you quoted consultants to the convention who were somewhat critical of the Judiciary Article, and some of the folks supporting SJR 3 have seized on this quote, which basically says Article IV goes a long way towards withdrawing the Judicial Council from popular control and turning it over to the Bar Association, and you also note that that criticism at the time didn't carry much weight with the framers, that it didn't even make it to the floor, and that the Judiciary Article was approved practically unanimously, but I'd like to know, what was your reaction to that criticism in 1955 and how do you feel about it now?

MR. FISCHER: Well, those -- I was very close to the consultants because I'd worked in the municipal arena before the convention and I had worked with them nationally, and so they brought that criticism to me, and I told them the convention has already overwhelmingly decided this is the way to keep the judiciary system away from politics, away from control by the executive or the legislative branches, and that this was already a compromise and that the retention elections provided the democratic controls necessary, and I think the retention system has worked extremely well because it's not just the lawyers and

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as I'm concerned, chief justice is free -- under the 1 2 constitution is free to vote in all cases --

the Bar Association be the vehicle.

- JUSTICE CARPENETI: Oh, my gosh. 3
 - MR. FISCHER: so there was no --
- 5 (Laughter)

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6 MR. FISCHER: There was no feeling that having four attorneys would overwhelm the nonattorney members. That's it. 8

So the attack on chief justice being biased or something is just 9 ridiculous

JUSTICE CARPENETI: So I take it that you'd have a similar answer to the notion that it's a conflict of interest for the chief justice to vote on -- in tie situations where the supreme court is at stake

MR. FISCHER: Well, I have seen the chief justices since the, you might say, beginning of time, but I think we have had most phenomenal chief justices, and the chief justice is the chief administrator of the court system. That chief justice has probably more of a vested interest in finding the best people to be judges than anybody else in the state. So I would say, right on, get the chief justice right out front of that.

(Applause)

MR. FISCHER: But I'm sorry if I'm treading on dangerous

24 JUSTICE CARPENETI: No, no, the only thing dangerous about 25

this interview is asking a question and looking really foolish

- laypeople on a judicial council who are involved in recommending
- retention or not. There's a whole process of law enforcement
- 3 people, jurors and others being queried about judges who are up
- 4 for retention

5 So we have a broad system in place that wasn't anticipated 6 and -- but, anyway, I -- Bill Egan, who was not an attorney,

told the consultants they can put a memo together, but the 8 committee of chairmen, we had 18 committee chairmen of -- or 15,

9 only about one-third of them were lawyers, and they rejected

10 any -- doing anything about the criticism. It's totally

11 irrelevant. We have a good democratic underpinning for the

12 judicial system through the process that we have.

JUSTICE CARPENETI: Okay, thanks. Let me -- boy, time flies when you're having fun. I -- I'm going to wrap this up. I'm going to skip over a lot of things that I'd hoped to ask you because we wanted to leave a minute or two for questions from the floor, but ask you this wrap-up question. With the perspective of 60 years' of experience for Alaska's grand experiment, how do you rate the performance of Article IV? Is there something you'd do differently or are you happy with it?

MR. FISCHER: Yeah, I'm totally happy. I -- as I was chatting with Bob Coats, the one criticism I have is the age 70 retirement requirement, and I want you to know that that seemed very reasonable when I was 31 years of age.

25 (Laughter and applause) (Pages 34 to 36)

Page 34 Page 36 1 1 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Well, let me thank you for coming here apply the facts of the law, and then you go on. 2 today and sharing your wisdom with us. I -- and I'm looking for 2 And so it's a big responsibility, but it's, I think -- I 3 Jeff. Can we open it for a few minutes of questions or -- okay. 3 mean, I really agree with Jay Rabinowitz's statement that the 4 If there are questions of Vic as to -- yes, Mike Wolverton. framers created a gem when they put the -- put Article IV 5 MR. WOLVERTON: You know, I have more of a question for 5 together, and the perfect balance between merit and appropriate 6 the group of judges who are sitting or retired judges here. I 6 political input I think is brilliant, and I think it's given us 7 wonder how many are like me. I would never, have ever run in a judiciary where you don't walk into a courtroom and say, now, 8 the political system for a judgeship, not in a million years 8 how much did this one contribute to my campaign and how much did (indiscernible). I wonder how many people (indiscernible) are 9 this one contribute to my opponent's campaign, and, you know, 9 10 in that group. (Indiscernible). 10 three years at going to conference of chief justices I met a lot 11 (Laughter) 11 of chief justices from other states and I never heard anyone say 12 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Thank you. Any other tough questions 12 anything other than you guys have a great system, and I think for Vic? 13 13 it's because of you, Vic, and your colleagues in 1955, and I 14 MR. FISCHER: Well, but let me put it to you. You have 14 think we all should be incredibly grateful for it, and I am. 15 been chief justice and a whole -- had a whole career in our 15 (End of recording) 16 judicial system. I think your bias has come through, but would 16 17 you do a wrap-up of have you seen any politics getting into the 17 18 selection of judges? Have you seen any corruptive influences or 18 19 to what extent have there been problems with the system that 19 20 20 call for any kind of changes in the article? 21 JUSTICE CARPENETI: Well, I'd have to say that I think the 21 22 system really demands a lot of the people that are in it and I 22 23 think it brings out the best of the people that are in it, and I 23 24 mean that in the sense that you don't decide to try to become a 24 25 judge unless you're willing to just kind of put your life on 25 Page 35 1 hold for six or eight months, expose yourself in a lot of ways 2 to everything. It's a tough process, the bar poll, and -- but 3 you have the sense that you're getting a fair hearing from 4 people that really want to make sure that the bench is a good 5 bench, and that's the merit phase. And then you have the 6 political phase, which is perfectly appropriate in that the 7 governor, who's the elected representative of the people, makes 8 the final choice, and then the vote --9 You know, like every other judge, when the retention 10 election's coming up I'm kind of thinking, oh, what have I done 11 wrong or, you know, how are the voters going to see this case or 12 that case, but it's -- it demands the -- of the people that do 13 it that they be willing to kind of make an open book, and then 14

You know, like every other judge, when the retention election's coming up I'm kind of thinking, oh, what have I done wrong or, you know, how are the voters going to see this case or that case, but it's -- it demands the -- of the people that do it that they be willing to kind of make an open book, and then once you're in the system you have the freedom and the luxury and the responsibility of making the best decision that you can make on that case according to what the law requires, and that is -- you know, I don't think I had a day in my life as a judge that I didn't make some decision that if I hadn't been in another kind of system I would have done it differently. I mean, judges all the time are applying laws that they would not have written that way or that maybe are a little too tough in one regard or they're too lenient in another regard, but you have the luxury of knowing that you take that out of it, what you do is try to figure out what the legislature was saying or what the constitutional framers meant, get the facts straight,

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DATED: February 23, 2016.

Dana J. Kelly

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